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Abstract
We study a seller’s trade credit provision decision in a situation of repeated contracting with incom-
plete information over the buyer’s payment propensity when the enforceability of formal contracts
is uncertain. The payment terms of a transaction are selected in an inter-temporal trade-off between
improving the quality of information acquisition and mitigating relationship breakdown risks. When
contract enforcement institutions are weak, the optimal within-relationship provision dynamics of
trade credit can be uniquely determined and depend on the share of patient buyers in the destination
market as well as their access to liquidity. We obtain empirical evidence showing that in developing
countries the relevance of trade credit in buyers’ payment schedules has risen over-proportionally in
recent years.
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1 Introduction
In developed economies, trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term finance in buyer-
seller transactions.1 The economics and finance literature explains its prevalence by stressing the Pareto-
improving potential of trade credit for inter-firm trade: On the one side, trade credit may provide buyers
with easier access to capital than raising credit through specialized financial institutions. On the other
side, sellers may be better than the latter in monitoring the credit risks of their buyers and thereby improve
transaction efficiency. Moreover, trade credit makes available a device for price discrimination or quality
assurance to sellers (cf. Petersen and Rajan, 1997). At the same time, offering trade credit exposes sellers
to uncertainty over the buyer’s ability and willingness to repay as well as over the legal enforceability
of repayment claims (cf. Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). In particular when buyers are located in developing
countries with weak contract enforcement institutions this uncertainty can constitute a severe economic
threat to trade credit-issuing firms.
Figure 1(a) provides a striking illustration of the relationship between the availability of trade credit
to buyers and the quality of contract enforcement of the country in which the latter are located. In a
cross section of 19 economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia the value share of inputs sourced by
buyers on post-shipment payment terms, and hence under the availability of trade credit, is significantly
higher the higher the institutional quality in the respective country. On average, firms receive more trade
credit from sellers the more reliable formal enforcement institutions are in their economy. At the same
time, while buyers in countries at the lower end of the institutional quality spectrum source a significantly
smaller share of their inputs on post-shipment terms the amounts are still sizeable. In 2005, the average
buyer from one of the five countries with the lowest institutional quality in our sample received trade
credit in the amount of 19.4 percent of the purchase value of sourced inputs. Adding to this, Figure
1(b) unveils that from 2005 to 2018 the value share of transactions involving a provision of trade credit
increased to a significantly larger extend in countries with lower enforcement quality suggesting that, in
relative terms, the less-developed economies are catching up.
To explain the strong and increasing availability of trade credit to buyers in developing countries, we
set up a repeated game model of a buyer-seller relationship in which the payment terms and trade volumes
of transactions are determined endogenously. We derive unique conditions to characterize the seller’s op-
timal choice between pre- and post-shipment payment terms over the course of a trade relationship. In
equilibrium, the optimal trade credit provision dynamics are determined by the seller’s assessment of
1Garcia-Marin et al. (2019) show that in 2017, non-financial U.S. firms had about $3 trillion in trade credit outstanding
equaling 20 percent of U.S. GDP.
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(a) Country-level averages in 2005.
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Figure 1: Input sourcing on trade credit terms and institutional quality.
The y-axis in Figure 1(a) corresponds to the percentage value share of firms’ purchases of material inputs or services for which
payment was due after the time of delivery, for firms from 19 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The y-axis in Figure
1(b) corresponds to the percentage change of the former variable from 2005 to 2018. The x-axis in both figures measures
countries’ institutional quality using the Rule of Law index by Kaufmann et al. (2009). See Appendix B for country codes and
Section 2 for data sources.
the buyer’s liquidity and patience level, and the corresponding evaluation of an inter-temporal trade-off
between relationship stability and stage payoff growth. This trade-off delivers a unique characterization
of the dynamically optimal choice of payment contracts only if contract enforcement institutions in the
destination market are sufficiently weak, implying a particular relevance of our model for the understand-
ing of payment contract choice in developing countries. By taking a relationship perspective on inter-firm
cooperation we build on important, previous work which has established that relationship-building is key
in understanding how business partners overcome the obstructions of weak institutions (e.g., see Banerjee
and Duflo, 2000; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015).
A key feature of our theory is that the seller faces uncertainty over the buyer’s type and access to
liquidity on the one side and the quality of contract enforcement institutions in the buyer’s economy
on the other side.2 Ex-ante, the seller faces uncertainty over either of these domains. However, while
the buyer’s liquidity status and the enforceability of contracts each follow a stochastic process that is
orthogonal to the specific buyer-seller relationship, the buyer’s type is fixed and the seller is able to
2The existing literature on inter-firm cooperation in dynamic environments distinguishes two important sources of uncer-
tainty, where the first relates to market conditions (see, e.g., Green and Porter, 1984), and the second to firm characteristics (see,
e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1988). The model presented here features both types of uncertainty – firm level uncertainty with respect
to the buyer’s payment morale and market uncertainty regarding the reliability of contract enforcement institutions.
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acquire new information on it as the relationship proceeds.
A first result of the paper is to show that payment contracts differ fundamentally in their capacity
to reveal information about the buyer’s type and in the respective risks of transaction failure.3 Payment
contracts can be interpreted as screening technologies each exerting a distinct influence on the stability
of buyer-supplier cooperation. Information acquisition is faster under cash in advance terms under which
the seller optimally proposes a separating contract that only those buyers accept that are patient and
liquid enough to comply. In contrast, the optimal spot contract under open account terms is always a
pooling contract implying that type information is acquired gradually over time. A crucial assumption to
obtain this result is that time is valuable and elapses between the seller’s investment in production and the
buyer’s revenue realization from the sale to final consumers, implying that financing trade is costly and
that payment contracts allow to shift this burden between the buyer and the seller. Correspondingly, in
the case of cash in advance the risk of transaction failure can be associated with the buyer not being able
or willing to finance trade while in the case of open account to legal institutions not being able to enforce
payment.
Acknowledging these screening properties of payment terms, we investigate how they affect the
seller’s optimal choice of payment contracts and hence the provision dynamics of trade credit. As men-
tioned above, for the case of economies with weak enforcement institutions these properties are sufficient
to uniquely identify the dynamically optimal sequence of payment contracts (DOSPC) of a trade rela-
tionship. Whenever institutions are sufficiently weak and the seller is patient enough the set of possible
DOSPCs contains exactly three elements. While two of these sequences do not contain switches between
payment terms over time, i.e. either cash in advance or open account terms are used in all periods, the
third predicts a transition from cash in advance to open account terms on the equilibrium path. In this
case, the seller initially exploits the buyer-separating nature of the cash in advance terms and by subse-
quently switching to open account the seller can eliminate the risk of relationship breakdown due to buyer
liquidity constraints in future transactions.4 This sharp characterization of the transmission between pay-
ment terms is not possible when contract enforcement work well. In this situation, open account terms
3Our main analysis focuses on cash in advance and open account payment contracts which define the point in time at which
the buyer should pay for the seller’s goods. Trade credit is provided to the buyer under open account where payment is made
only after the delivery of goods. No trade credit is provided to the buyer under cash in advance where payment is made upfront.
4Access to credit and liquidity are a particular obstacle to firms in developing countries (cf. Harrison and McMillan, 2003;
Fuchs et al., 2020). As a consequence, usage of cash in advance terms exposes the stability of trade relationships to a particular
risk in these environments.
The separation of buyer types in the initial transaction also implies a structural difference in the optimal trade volumes under
this payment sequence when compared to the case where open account terms are used over the entire trade relationship. While
in the former situation trade volumes are comparatively large starting from the first transaction in the latter they increase slowly
and step-wise over time.
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guarantee comparably high stage payoffs from the very first transaction since buyer trade credit repay-
ment can be enforced through institutions. This marginalizes the payoff-enhancing screening qualities of
cash in advance. As a consequence, the analysis of the optimal transition patterns becomes intractable
since the payoff-relevance of learning for the seller is low.
When presuming a sufficiently low level of contract enforceability, the model predicts that the seller
will more likely extend trade credit to the buyer the higher the probability that the latter looses access to
liquidity and the smaller the probability to get matched with a buyer of patient type in the future, i.e. one
who complies with the optimal contracting terms. In equilibrium, this pattern holds for both – new and
established trade relationships. Moreover, whenever the seller provides trade credit in a relationship the
offered amount of such credit increases over time. These predictions are consistent with empirical patterns
on the availability of trade credit to developing country buyers documented in other papers. McMillan and
Woodruff (1999) show using firm survey data from Vietnam that prior experience with business partners
matters for the provision of trade credit and that trade relationships of longer duration can be associated
with higher levels of trade credit provision. Antràs and Foley (2015) use transaction-level data from a
manufacturing U.S. exporter to show that transactions are less likely to occur on cash in advance terms
and more likely to occur on post-shipment terms as buyer-supplier relationships develop. Garcia-Marin et
al. (2019) identify a highly comparable usage pattern of payment contracts using representative customs
data from Chile.
In an extension, we incorporate the possibility for the seller to obtain trade credit insurance from a
competitive insurance market. In particular when it comes to international trade, a substantial part of
transactions are backed by export credit insurances (cf. Van der Veer, 2015). In our model, the insurance
takes over the risk of non-repayment of the trade credit and generates value for the seller through the
insurer’s expertise in the screening of buyers. We show that the unique identification of the DOSPC
remains possible when insurance becomes available and provide analytical conditions for the situations
in which insurance is optimal. The qualitative prediction of trade credit provision in our model remain
valid when trade credit insurance is an option for the seller.
Our analysis builds on two broad strands of literature where the first studies the financing terms of
inter-firm trade. It extends the interpretation of trade credit by Smith (1987) who first acknowledged its
role as a screening device for sellers to elicit information about buyer characteristics. More generally,
the paper is related to a literature that sees credit rationing as a way to screen borrowers in markets
with incomplete information (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Our model gives conditions under which, in
equilibrium, trade credit is rationed either temporarily or permanently where in the former case this is
4
due to screening considerations and in the latter case because financing trade is costly for the seller.
Most closely related to our work is a small set of papers that studies the provision of trade credit in
settings with repeated buyer-seller interaction. Their results are complementary to ours. The setup of our
model features similarities to that of Antràs and Foley (2015) who investigate the impact of a financial
crisis in a dynamic model of payment contract choice. While they also study transitions between pay-
ment terms over time their model does not incorporate that the information acquisition process of sellers
differs fundamentally between cash in advance and post shipment terms, inducing structural differences
in the optimal growth patterns of transaction volumes and per-period payoffs. Garcia-Marin et al. (2019)
derive conditions under which the provision of trade credit increases in attractiveness to sellers as their
relationships with buyers mature. While in their model this prediction originates from a financing advan-
tage for sellers under trade credit terms, it originates from a simplified access to liquidity for the buyer
in our setting. Fuchs et al. (2020) conduct a field experiment in Uganda to show that restricted access
to liquidity is a key impediment to the business of buyers in developing countries. Like us, they study
theoretically how the distribution of products in developing markets can be implemented optimally in a
dynamic setting. While in their work the buyer’s credit line is fixed over time in our model the existence
and size of the optimal trade credit line can vary with the age of trade relationships.5
While the main focus of this paper is on the self-financing of trade through the buyer and the seller,
a large literature investigates the rationales of firms to use trade credit instead of credit provided by
external financial institutions. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) derive conditions under which trade and bank
credit interact either as complements or substitutes with each other. Demir and Javorcik (2018) interpret
trade credit provision as a margin of firm adjustment to competitive pressures arising from globalization.
Engemann et al. (2014) understand trade credit as a quality signalling device that facilitates obtaining
complementary bank credits. Moreover, our work is connected to a literature on payment guarantees
in international trade finance through the discussion of trade credit insurance in Section 6. A concise
summary of the most relevant work from this field was recently provided by Foley and Manova (2015).
The second broad strand of related literature investigates the microeconomic aspects of learning and
trade dynamics which, on the one side, considers applications to topics in international trade and, on
the other side, contains papers of a purely contract-theoretic nature. Araujo et al. (2016) study how
contract enforcement and trade experience shape firm trade dynamics when information about buyers is
5Beyond relationship aspects, the economic literature discusses further and complementary channels affecting the availabil-
ity of trade credit to developing country buyers. Common membership in business or ethnic networks tends to increase the
willingness of sellers to provide trade credit (see Biggs et al., 2002; Fafchamps, 1997). Also, the level of competition among
sellers is positively associated with the availability of trade credit to buyers (see Hyndman and Serio, 2010; Demir and Javorcik,
2018). In contrast to our work, these papers do not study the dynamic aspects of trade relationships.
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incomplete. We share with their work the probabilistic approach to contract enforcement, and the patterns
of information acquisition and trade volume growth predicted by our model resemble the outcomes of
their framework in the special situation when the seller continuously employs open account terms. Rauch
and Watson (2003) study a matching problem between a buyer and a seller with one-sided incomplete
information. They derive conditions under which starting a relationship with small trade volumes is
preferable to starting with large transaction volumes from the very beginning. This pattern features a
clear analogy to our model in which starting a relationship on open account terms corresponds to starting
small, and on cash in advance terms to starting large. Extending beyond the scope of our analysis, Ghosh
and Ray (1996) and Watson (1999, 2002) study agents’ incentives to start small when information is
incomplete on both sides of the market.6
Moreover, our work is related to a literature on self-enforcing relational contracts in the spirit of
Thomas and Worrall (1994), Baker et al. (2002), and Levin (2003). Like us, Sobel (2006), MacLeod
(2007), and Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) study the interaction of formal and self-enforcing contracts in
repeated game models when legal contract enforcement is probabilistic. Most closely related to us is
Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) who investigate a situation of repeated investment in a principal-agent setting
with endogenous verifiability of the contracting terms. While in their setting verifiability is endogenized
through the principal’s investment in contract quality in our model the relevance of verifiability itself
is endogenized through payment contract choice. The paper also adds to a growing literature on non-
stationary relational contracts with adverse selection, in which contractual terms vary with relationship
length. While in our paper learning about the buyer induces transitions between payment contract types,
previous work has studied non-stationarities in different contexts.7 Also related to us is Troya-Martinez
(2017) who studies relational contracts for a scenario in which trade credit is provided for every business
transaction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out own evidence from
cross-country survey data on how the quality of contract enforcement institutions shapes the availability
of trade credit to buyers, and how the impact of institutions has changed in recent years. In Section 3
we introduce the building blocks of our analysis and, in Section 4, we study supply relationships under
6Beyond the case of buyer-seller transactions, relationship building has also been analysed in the context of different appli-
cations. See, e.g., Kranton (1996) and Halac (2014).
7Chassang (2010) examines how agents with conflicting interests can develop successful cooperation when details about
cooperation are not common knowledge. Halac (2012) studies optimal relational contracts when the value of a principal-agent
relationship is not commonly known and, also, how information revelation affects the dynamics of the relationship. Yang (2013)
investigates firm-internal wage dynamics when worker types are private information. Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2015) analyse
labour markets in which firms motivate their workers through relational contracts and study the effects of on-the-job search on
employment contracts. Moreover, Defever et al. (2016) study buyer-supplier relationships in international trade in which new
information can initiate a relational contract between parties.
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cash in advance and open account payment contracts when switches between payment terms are ruled
out. Section 5 introduces this possibility and we investigate the seller’s optimal usage of payment terms
over the course of trade relationships. In Section 6 we extend our model and incorporate the availability
of trade credit insurance to the seller. The last section concludes with a summary of our findings.
2 Empirical evidence on trade credit
We conduct our own empirical analysis on how a country’s institutional environment affects the propen-
sity of its firms to purchase material inputs or services on trade credit. For this purpose, we rely on
firm establishment-level cross-sectional data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys (BEEPS), conducted by theWorld Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment in countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. For our analysis we use data from BEEPS survey
waves III, V, and VI, conducted in the years 2005, 2012-2016, and 2018-2020, respectively. The surveys
provide information on a broad range of business environment topics including firms’ access to finance.8
The main question of interest from the surveys is about the percentage of the value of total annual pur-
chases of material inputs or services that was purchased on credit (i.e. paid after delivery/provision of
service) in the last year. When interpreted in the context of trade relationships, the question inquires
about the value share of a buyer’s purchase transactions for which the seller made available trade credit
to the buyer.
The BEEPS data also provides information on further firm characteristics, which we use to build a
set of establishment-level control variables. In particular, we rely on the number of full-time permanent
employees at the establishment, whether the firm is composed of more establishments than the one inter-
viewed, and whether it directly exports its products. Moreover, we use information about the availability
of a checking or savings account as well as whether the interviewed establishment manager assesses its
access to finance as a major obstacle to the current operations of the firm. Establishments are assigned
to industries (ISIC Rev. 3.1) by the product that generated the largest proportion of their sales in the
last fiscal year. For the empirical analysis to be in line with our theoretical model we include only the
establishments from the manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade industries into the empirical analysis.9
The second key variable in our analysis is the institutional quality parameter IQc,t which, following
Araujo et al. (2016), we proxy with the Rule of Law index fromKaufmann et al. (2009). This index ranges
8The BEEPS survey data was used before to investigate the development of credit markets across countries. E.g., see
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) or Popov (2014). The research questions of these papers are different to ours.
9A robustness check reported in Appendix B shows that including also the firms from the other industries into the analysis
does not change our empirical results.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
Firm-level observations
Share of inputs purchased on trade credit 22,686 33.51 35.60 0.00 100.00
Number of full-time employees 22,686 87.55 539.28 1.00 64,000.00
Multi-establishment firm 22,665 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Export status 22,686 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Checking or savings account 22,633 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00
Access to finance an obstacle 22,210 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Country-year-level observations
Rule of Law index, IQc,t 22,686 -0.32 0.69 -1.46 1.24
GDP (in constant 2010 billion US$) 22,686 517.86 638.66 3.86 1,722.19
OECD membership 22,686 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
from −2.5 to 2.5 and corresponds to a weighted average of several variables that measure individuals’
perceptions of the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts in
country c in year t. Studying trade credit take-up in relation to institutional quality is particularly attractive
for the countries contained in the BEEPS data since they exhibit substantial variation in the Rule of Law
index, which varies between −1.46 (Uzbekistan in 2005) and 1.24 (Estonia in 2018) in our sample. As
institutions change slowly over time, almost all the variation in IQc,t is across countries (cf. Araujo et
al., 2016).10 To simplify the interpretation of our results we use the Rule of Law scores of 2012 in
the regression analysis, which we report for the countries of our sample in Appendix B. The qualitative
predictions of our empirical analysis are unvaried when employing the Rule of Law scores of different
sample years.
We also include control variables at the country-year level to account for differences in the economic
development status of countries. This includes their annual GDP which we borrow from the World
Development Indicators database of the World Bank as well as their time-specific membership status to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). When excluding all countries
that are not observed in the BEEPS wave VI and not at least in two waves of the survey, we are left
with 19 economies and summarize the descriptives for these countries in Table 1.11 The countries in our
sample are highly heterogeneous in terms of their economic development and range from low-income
developing to high-income developed economies. In Appendix B, we give a detailed description of the
country sample and the number of respondents for each country and year.
Table 2 summarizes our results from ordinary least-squares regressions for different sets of controls.
10For the countries in our sample the correlation of IQc,2005 and IQc,2018 is 0.93.
11At the time when this paper was written, wave VI of the BEEPS was still in progress in some countries. Our study includes
only data of those countries for which the survey round had already been fully completed.
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They explain the percentage share of inputs purchased by establishments on trade credit terms (as opposed
to purchases with payment due at or before product delivery) by the respective country’s Rule of Law,
IQc, year dummies indicating the respective survey wave as well as their interactions with the Rule
of Law index, and a constant. In specifications (2)-(4) we also include further control variables at the
establishment and the country-year level, as summarized and classified in Table 1.12 However, we do not
show these estimates because they are of no further interest for our analysis.
Table 2: Institutional quality and input purchases on trade credit.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IQc 18.64** 18.60** 19.23** 16.09**
(3.26) (3.25) (2.67) (3.75)
IQc × Year2012 -2.62 -0.62 -1.13 -1.76
(5.10) (4.52) (4.05) (4.61)
IQc × Year2018 -11.38
+ -11.63* -12.78* -14.27*
(5.73) (5.69) (5.29) (5.76)
Year2012 10.43** 10.66** 10.39** 10.58**
(3.89) (3.73) (3.31) (3.67)
Year2018 -7.49 -8.53
+ -7.67+ -8.63+
(4.72) (4.78) (4.49) (4.49)
Constant 36.56** 28.70** 26.17** 34.13+
(2.67) (3.21) (7.21) (19.60)
Firm-level controls N Y Y Y
Industry dummies N N Y Y
Country-level controls N N N Y
Observations 22,686 22,141 22,141 22,141
R2 0.104 0.119 0.139 0.142
Joint significance
(Prob > F)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm-level and country-level controls contain all the variables described in
Table 1. Industry dummies are included at the 2-digit division level of the
ISIC Rev. 3.1 classification. We only consider firms in the manufacturing
or wholesale and retail trade industries. The number of observations per in-
dustry and year are reported in the Appendix, Table B.3. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-year level and reported in parentheses. Significance
levels: ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1
The econometric analysis delivers the following results, which are qualitatively robust across speci-
fications (1)-(4) and further substantiate the evidence presented in Figure 1. First, there exists a strong
positive relationship between the prevalence of trade credit and the quality of legal institutions. In our
preferred model specification (4) – which includes the full battery of firm-, industry-, and country-level
controls – increasing the Rule of Law index by one unit increases trade credit usage in firms’ total input
sourcing volume by 16.1 percentage points for the average firm interviewed in the 2005 survey wave,
12For the regressions, the variables “Number of full-time employees” and “GDP” were transformed with the natural logarithm.
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holding all other control variables constant. Second, from 2005 to 2018 trade credit usage has – in rel-
ative terms – become more important for firms in countries with weaker legal institutions compared to
those with stronger institutions. This follows from the negative and statistically significant coefficient of
the interaction term IQc× Year2018 and that the interaction term IQc× Year2012 is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Model (4) predicts that, from 2005 to 2018, an average firms associated with a specific
value of the Rule of Law index experiences a 14.3 percentage points stronger increase in the usage of
trade credit compared to its counterpart located in a country with a one unit larger index value.13
Taking stock, we find that over the course of recent years the quality level of countries’ legal insti-
tutions had a systematic impact on the availability of trade credit to buyers. The analysis shows that
in countries with weak institutions trade credit availability increased relatively more from 2005 to 2018
when compared to their more institutionally-developed counterparts. Given the documented positive re-
lationship of institutional quality and trade credit availability in 2005, the results moreover suggest that
the inequality between countries in their access to trade credit has decreased in recent years. We take
the increasing availability of trade credit to buyers in less-developed economies as motivation for our
theoretical investigations in the following sections. There, we propose a model to study the strategic
rationales of sellers to provide trade credit in their relationships with buyers. We identify a trade-off that
is important in particular when destination countries feature weak legal institutions and provide highly
tractable predictions on the optimal provision of trade credit in these environments.
3 The model
The model considers the problem of a seller (“he”) who markets a product through a buyer (“she”) to
final consumers. There exists a continuum of potential buyers with the ability to distribute the seller’s
product. The seller is a monopolist for the offered product and has constant marginal production costs
c > 0. Selling Qt ≥ 0 units of the product to the final consumers in period t generates revenue R(Qt) =
Q1−αt /(1− α), which is realized by the buyer. The revenue function is increasing and concave in the
trade volume Qt, where α ∈ (0, 1) determines the shape of the revenue function.
14
We model the buyer-seller relationship as a repeated game, where in every period t = 0, 1, 2, ...
a transaction is performed. The seller can engage in only one partnership at the same time. In every
13We conducted a set of further robustness checks for these predictions in which we exclude multi-establishment firms and
where we focus exclusively on exporters. Both of our main empirical results are maintained under these restrictions. For details,
see Table B.4 in the Appendix.
14Whether the concave shape of the revenue function stems from technology, preferences or market structure is not important
for the analysis below.
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period, the seller first decides either to continue the relationship with his current buyer or to re-match
and start a new partnership. He then proposes a spot contract Ct = {Qt, Tt, Ft} to the buyer specifying
a trade volume Qt ≥ 0, a transfer payment Tt from the buyer to the seller, and a payment contract,
Ft ∈ F = {A,Ω}, that determines the point in time at which the transfer Tt is made.
15 Depending on
the payment contract, the seller receives the transfer either before he produces and ships the goods (cash
in advance terms, Ft = A) or after the buyer has sold them (open account terms, Ft = Ω). The contract
Ct therefore determines the timing of the stage game which we summarize graphically in Figure 2.
Matching
Contract Ct
signed
Production +
Shipment of Qt
Sale of Qt
Payment
Tt
t t+ 1
Ft = A Ft = Ω
Figure 2: The spot contract Ct determines the timing of the stage game.
The timing of the transfer is payoff-relevant because shipment is time-consuming and players discount
payoffs over time. Goods that are produced and shipped by the seller in period t can be sold to consumers
only in the subsequent period t + 1. The corresponding discount factor of the seller is denoted by δS ∈
(0, 1). The buyer comes in one of two possible fixed types, j ∈ {M,B}. Either she is fully myopic,
j = M , with discount factor δM = 0 and associates positive value only to payoffs of the current period.
Alternatively, the buyer is patient, j = B, with discount factor δB ∈ (0, 1). The assumptions imply that
by choosing open account terms the seller extends trade credit to the buyer while this is not the case
under cash in advance terms. Whenever the seller decides to match with a new buyer he draws her type
from an i.i.d. two-point distribution, where with probability θˆ ∈ (0, 1) the buyer is myopic, and patient
otherwise. We denote the seller’s belief that the buyer is myopic in period t by θt and assume that the
seller holds the belief θ0 = θˆ at the beginning of the initial transaction with a new buyer.
Access to sufficient credit and liquidity are a key obstacle to firms in developing countries and, more-
over, can be difficult to assess for sellers (cf. Harrison and McMillan, 2003; Fuchs et al., 2020). To
incorporate the repercussions of a buyer’s possibly limited access to liquidity into our model we assume
that the seller faces uncertainty over the buyer’s liquidity status, i.e. her ability to pay cash in advance.
While any buyer is liquid ex-ante, she can become permanently illiquid and unable to pay cash in advance
in any period with an i.i.d. probability of 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning of the contracting stage, the
buyer privately updates her liquidity status.
15We assume that the seller can offer only one single contract to the buyer and rule out contract menus.
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In every period, the contract Ct can be enforced with an i.i.d. probability λ ∈ (0, 1). In our ap-
plication, for the buyer this corresponds to the probability of not being able to deviate from making the
prescribed transfer Tt and for the seller to the probability of being forced to produce and ship as agreed-
upon. The seller cannot observe whether or not contracts are enforceable in any period. By using this
probabilistic approach of contract enforcement we follow an established literature that studies trade re-
lationships in the presence of weak contract enforcement (see Araujo and Ornelas, 2007; Araujo et al.,
2016; Antràs and Foley, 2015).16
In the following, we summarize the stage game of period t which is repeated ad infinitum.
Stage game timing.
1. Revenue realization. The product shipped in the previous period generates revenue R(Qt−1) to
the buyer from the sale to final consumers.
2. Payment (if Ft−1 = Ω). The buyer decides whether to transfer Tt−1 to the seller. She finds
an opportunity not to pay with probability 1 − λ. Upon non-payment the match is permanently
dissolved.
3. Matching. Whenever unmatched, the seller starts a new partnership. Otherwise, the seller chooses
either to stick to the current buyer or to re-match with a new one.
4. Contracting.
• The seller decides whether to propose a one-period spot contract Ct = {Qt, Tt, Ft} to the
buyer. The contract specifies a trade volume Qt, a transfer Tt, and a payment contract Ft.
Upon non-proposal, the match is permanently dissolved.
• The buyer updates her liquidity status and decides either to accept or to reject Ct. Upon
rejection, the match is permanently dissolved.
5. Payment (if Ft = A). The buyer decides whether to transfer Tt to the seller. She finds an opportu-
nity not to pay with probability 1− λ. Upon non-payment the match is permanently dissolved.
6. Production and Shipment. The seller decides whether to produce and ship Qt as specified in the
contract. Upon non-shipment the match is permanently dissolved.
16In relation to our empirical analysis in Section 2, we can think of the model parameter λ to be positively related to the Rule
of Law index from Kaufmann et al. (2009).
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For the following, it will be helpful to define by C = (Ct)
∞
t=0 the sequence of spot contracts offered
by the seller over the course of the relationship. Moreover, we denote byQ = (Qt)
∞
t=0, T = (Tt)
∞
t=0, and
F = (Ft)
∞
t=0 the corresponding sequences for trade volumes, transfer payments, and payment contracts,
respectively.
4 Payment contracts in isolation
In this section, we study in isolation the two cases where the seller is restricted to choose either cash in
advance or open account payment terms for all periods and rule out switches between payment terms
over time. This corresponds to a situation in which the seller grants trade credit for either none or all
transactions of a relationship. The possibility to vary the trade credit provision over time is introduced in
Section 5 in which the seller can freely choose the payment contract in the spot contract of any transaction.
This expositional approach not only allows us to highlight the different screening properties of payment
contract types but also requires us to derive two repeated game equilibria that are both relevant in our
study of dynamic optimality.
We consider the following strategy profile. In both scenarios, the seller forms a new partnership
whenever unmatched. He terminates an existing partnership if and only if the buyer defaults on the
contract. In any period t, the seller chooses a trade volume Qt and a transfer Tt that maximize his
current period expected payoffs.17 The buyer accepts the proposed contract Ct whenever participation
promises her an expected payoff at least covering her outside option. The buyer’s behaviour with respect
to an accepted contract is fully determined by her type. The myopic type will deviate from any accepted
contract and not pay the transfer whenever it can not be enforced. In contrast, the patient buyer is patient
enough to never default from an accepted contract (by assumption). The employed equilibrium concept
is that of sequential equilibrium.18
Throughout, we assume that the transfer Tt is a share s
i ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ F , of the revenue generated by
the current transaction, i.e. Tt ≡ s
iR(Qt). This specification allows the seller to set a transfer that can be
made specific to the type of the payment contract.19 Moreover, we normalize the outside options of all
parties to zero.
17Since we assume that only spot contracts are feasible and switching between payment contract types is ruled out for this
section the maximization of the current period expected payoffs implies that the ex-ante expected payoffs are maximized simul-
taneously.
18For adverse selection scenarios as we study them here, sequential equilibrium is the relevant notion of equilibrium, see
Mailath and Samuelson (2006), pp. 158–159.
19Note that we restrict the transferred revenue share si to be time-invariant. This restriction improves the tractability of
our analysis of optimal payment contract choice in Section 5 considerably. At the same time, transfers remain proportionally
adjustable to the revenue size of a transaction.
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4.1 Cash in advance terms
First, we study the case where the seller is restricted to write contracts on cash in advance terms (A-terms)
only, i.e. in any trade relationship F = (A, ...). Under this payment sequence the seller never provides
trade credit to the buyer and, hence, buyer liquidity is essential for the success of a transaction. We model
the buyer’s liquidity status by assuming that her self-perceived discount factor under A-terms drops to
zero whenever she turns illiquid. The participation constraint of a buyer of type j ∈ {M,B} in period t
is:
(✶j,tδj − s
A)R(Qt) ≥ 0, (PC
A
j,t)
where ✶j,t indicates the buyer’s liquidity status in period t. The constraint states, that tomorrow’s revenue
R(Qt) realized from the sale of today’s shipment Qt must be larger than the share s
A of the revenue that
the buyer has to transfer to the seller before shipment. Because goods can be sold to final consumers only
in the period following t, the revenue is multiplied by the buyer’s self-perceived discount factor ✶j,tδj .
Observe that because δM = 0, the myopic buyer’s participation constraint, (PC
A
M,t), cannot be fulfilled
for any sA > 0. The same holds true for a patient yet illiquid buyer, i.e. when ✶B,tδB = 0. Consequently,
the myopic buyer and the illiquid patient buyer will never accept any contract on A-terms.
Acknowledging this, the seller offers a separating contract that only a liquid patient buyer accepts.
He will do so by setting sA = δB ≡ s˜
A and extract all rents from her. In this situation, the seller’s stage
payoff maximization problem under A-terms in period t is given as:
max
Qt
piAt (Qt) = s˜
AR(Qt)− cQt,
i.e. he setsQt to maximize the difference between his revenue share and the production costs. Obviously,
under A-terms the optimal trade volume is the same for all periods and given as:
QA ≡ argmax
Qt
piAt (Qt) =
(
δB
c
) 1
α
, ∀t ≥ 0.
The corresponding stage payoffs, conditional on contract acceptance, are given as:
piA ≡ piAt (Q
A) = (δB)
1
α c
α−1
α
α
1− α
, ∀t ≥ 0.
In order to derive the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs, it is important to note that whenever a new
trade relationship survives the initial transaction the seller can be certain to be matched with a patient
buyer. Correspondingly, his belief jumps from θ0 = θˆ to θ1 = 0 right after the initial contract is accepted
and remains at this level for all further transactions with that same buyer. Hence, the ex-ante expected
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payoffs from conducting an infinite sequence of transactions on A-terms can be derived from solving the
following dynamic programming problem:
V A0 = γ(1− θ0)
[
piA + δSV
A
1
]
+ (1− γ(1− θ0))δSV
A
0 , (1)
V A1 = γ[pi
A + δSV
A
1 ] + (1− γ)δSV
A
0 .
Note that a trade relationship with the same patient buyer is productive and continued only if this buyer
remains liquid in the respective period, i.e. with probability γ. Solving the programming problem for V A0
gives the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs under A-terms, ΠA. They are:
ΠA =
γ(1− θ0)pi
A
(1− δS)(1− γθ0δS)
.
Under A-terms, the buyer has to make the transfer before the seller’s production and shipment de-
cision. Consequently, the seller may have an incentive to deviate and not produce the output, seize the
transfer, and re-match to a new buyer in the next period. The following Lemma 1 provides parameter
restrictions that rule out any such deviation and guarantees equilibrium existence.20
Lemma 1. Suppose that α > α˜ ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a repeated game equilibrium that maximizes
the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs under cash in advance terms, ΠA, for all δS ≥ δ˜S ∈ (0, 1).
Proof See Appendix.
Some remarks on Lemma 1 are in order. For an equilibrium of the repeated game to exist the revenue
R(QA) and therefore the stage payoffs generated from the sale of QA units of the product must be
large enough, i.e. larger than some threshold level implied by α˜ and satisfied for all α > α˜ (since
∂piAt /∂α > 0). Otherwise, a deviation by the seller cannot be ruled out since the transaction’s profit
margin becomes negligible and the deviation ensures the seller the full transfer at zero cost. Provided that
α > α˜ holds there exist repeated game equilibria rationalizing the behaviour prescribed by the strategy
profile if the seller’s valuation of the stream of transfers from the current buyer is high enough, as implied
by the minimum discount factor δ˜S . Proposition 1 summarizes our key findings on the cash in advance
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that payment is only possible on A-terms and Lemma 1 holds. Then the seller
proposes a separating contract Ct that only liquid patient buyers accept. In every period, the seller
produces and ships the payoff-maximizing trade volume QA. The expected stage payoffs increase from
20To improve readability, the explicit statement and the derivations of all parameter thresholds of the paper are omitted in the
main text and can be found in the Appendix.
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γ(1 − θ0)pi
A to γpiA after the first transaction and stay at this level for the remainder of the trade
relationship. The seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs are ΠA.
Proof Analysis in the text.
There are several points noteworthy about this equilibrium. First, profit maximization under cash
in advance terms necessarily separates buyer types as these are very demanding for the buyer. This is
demonstrated by the fact that A-terms exclude the myopic and illiquid patient buyers from cooperation
altogether. For the seller, cash in advance terms have the advantage of excluding any risk of non-payment
altogether and imply that the time-invariant trade volume QA is optimal beginning with the first trans-
action. Moreover, all information about the buyer’s type is acquired immediately with the acceptance or
rejection of the initial contract C0.
21
4.2 Open account terms
Let us now turn to the case where the seller is restricted to write contracts on open account terms (Ω-
terms) only, i.e. in any trade relationship F = (Ω, ...). This case implies that trade credit is offered to the
buyer in any transaction. Based on the strategy profile we can write the participation constraints of the
two buyer types for a period t contract as:
(1− sΩ)R(Qt) ≥ 0, (PC
Ω
B)
(1− λsΩ)R(Qt) ≥ 0, (PC
Ω
M )
where (PCΩB) is the participation constraint of the patient buyer and (PC
Ω
M ) that of the myopic buyer, re-
spectively. A comparison reveals that underΩ-terms it is impossible to construct a separating contract that
would guarantee to select only patient buyers. The reasons are twofold. First, myopic buyers anticipate
to transfer a share of the generated revenue only if the seller can enforce the contract. This happens with
probability λ and makes their PC more lenient compared to that of the patient type. Second, discounting
and liquidity concerns do not affect the buyer’s participation decision since both, revenue realization and
payment for a period t contract happen in period t + 1. Consequently, since sΩ ∈ (0, 1), any feasible
transaction on open account terms involves a pooling contract.
Suppose now that buyers behave as prescribed by the strategy profile and consider the seller’s belief
on the buyer’s type. Observe that patient buyers will never deviate and myopic types do so whenever
21Note that the separation outcome under A-terms does not hinge on the assumption of a fully myopic buyer. Inspection of
the buyer participation constraints shows that for any δM ∈ (0, 1), with δM < δB , a payoff-maximizing contract can be written
that only the more patient type accepts.
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possible (i.e. they do not make the transfer when contracts can not be enforced). Hence, if no deviation
occurs up to the tth transaction with the same buyer, the seller’s belief of facing a myopic type in period
t is given by Bayes’ rule as:
θΩt =
θˆλt
1− θˆ(1− λt)
. (2)
Using equation (2), the payment probability in period t of a relationship can be written as Λ(t, θˆ, λ) =
1− θΩt (1−λ) = [1− θˆ(1−λ
t+1)]/[1− θˆ(1−λt)] ≡ Λt. Note that limt→∞ θ
Ω
t = 0 and limt→∞ Λt = 1,
i.e. as the relationship with a buyer continues the seller’s belief of being matched with a myopic type
converges to zero while the associated payment probability converges to one. In the following, we will
refer to this limiting situation in which the seller is sure to be matched with a patient buyer as the full
information limit.
Equipped with this notion of belief formation and updating, the optimal trade volume QΩt in period t
can be derived from maximizing the seller’s stage game payoffs:
QΩt ≡ argmax
Qt
δSΛts
ΩR(Qt)− cQt.
While the seller has to bear the costs of production cQΩt already in period t, he receives the expected
transfer Λts
ΩR(QΩt ) only in the following period which is therefore discounted by δS .
Under open account terms, when deciding on the transfer Tt it is not enough to merely account for the
buyer’s participation constraint to guarantee that the patient buyer does not deviate from the contract. Her
granted revenue share must be large enough such that she does not seize the period’s entire revenue and
accepts being re-matched. The following Lemma 2 gives a simple condition that ensures buyer behaviour
as prescribed by the strategy profile, while maximizing the seller’s stage game payoffs.
Lemma 2. Under open account terms, the seller sets s˜Ω = δB . He thereby makes the patient buyer
indifferent between paying and not paying the agreed-upon transfer and maximizes his own payoffs.
Proof See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 2 is that the equilibrium transfer to the seller is the same revenue
share under both payment contract types. To simplify notation, we define the equilibrium revenue share
as s˜ ≡ s˜Ω = s˜A for the following.
Using (2), the optimal trade volume QΩt and the corresponding stage game payoff pi
Ω(QΩt ) in the tth
transaction with a buyer on open account terms can be calculated as:
QΩt =
(
δSδBΛt
c
) 1
α
, piΩ(QΩt ) = (δSδBΛt)
1
α c
α−1
α
α
1− α
.
17
We define the trade volume and stage payoffs at the full information limit as:
QΩ ≡ lim
t→∞
QΩt =
(
δSδB
c
) 1
α
, piΩ ≡ lim
t→∞
piΩ(QΩt ) = (δSδB)
1
α c
α−1
α
α
1− α
.22
The seller’s ex-ante expected payoff from a trade relationship on open account terms, ΠΩ, can be
obtained from solving the following dynamic programming problem for V Ω0 :
∀t ≥ 0 : V Ωt = pi
Ω(QΩt ) + δS
(
ΛtV
Ω
t+1 + (1− Λt)V
Ω
0
)
. (3)
In the Appendix, we derive the following solution to this problem:
ΠΩ =
1− δSλ
1− δSλ− δSθ0(1− λ)
piΩ
∞∑
t=0
δtSΛ
1
α
t (1− θ0(1− λ
t)).
We summarize our findings on the open account equilibrium in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose that payments are only possible on Ω-terms. Then the seller proposes a pooling
contract to the buyer and updates his belief as prescribed by θΩt as the relationship proceeds. Based on
this belief, the trade volume QΩt (the expected stage payoffs pi
Ω
t ) increase gradually with the age of the
relationship and converge to the full information levelQΩ (piΩ). The ex-ante expected payoffs of the seller
are ΠΩ.
Proof Analysis in the text.
4.3 Discussion
A comparison of the results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 reveals important differences between cash in advance
and open account payment terms. On the one side, they can be summarized as features related to the
learning process about the buyer, and to the risks of relationship breakdown on the other side.
First, consider the learning process about the buyer in a new relationship. Under cash in advance
terms, the seller optimally offers a separating stage contract that immediately reveals the buyer’s type. In
contrast, immediate separation is not possible under Ω-terms where the payoff-maximizing stage contract
necessarily features the pooling of buyer types. In this case, type information is acquired only gradu-
ally over time through the Bayesian updating process (see equation 2). Type separation under A-terms
translates into a comparably high trade volume QA from the very first transaction while trade volumes
22For later use, note that the expected stage payoffs under belief θΩt can be rewritten as an expression that is proportional to
the stage payoffs at the full information limit, i.e. piΩ(QΩt ) = Λ(t, θˆ, λ)
1
α piΩ.
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under Ω-terms grow over time and converge to the belief-fee level QΩ as the relationship matures. This
has immediate repercussions on the development of the expected stage payoffs over the course of a trade
relationship. While under A-terms the expected stage payoffs jump immediately after the first successful
transaction from γ(1−θ0)pi
A to γpiA and remain at this level for all following periods with the same buyer
they increase at a strictly slower rate under Ω-terms as determined by the Bayesian updating process up
to the level piΩ.23
Second, let us compare the risks of transaction failure across payment terms. Under the considered
strategy profile, transaction failure directly corresponds to the breakdown of the trade relationship with
a buyer. It turns out that while under A-terms transaction failure can be exclusively triggered by buyer
characteristics (i.e., her type and/or liquidity status) under Ω-terms the institutional environment in which
the transaction takes place is decisive. Under the latter, a transaction can be unsuccessful only if contracts
cannot be enforced which induces the non-payment of the transfer Tt in a match with a myopic buyer. In
contrast, A-terms do not involve any payment risk since the transfer is made already before production
and shipment. However, the latter can still result in an unsuccessful transaction in case of a match with a
myopic or illiquid patient buyer, both of which leads to buyer non-participation. Ex-ante to contracting,
the probability of transaction failure in period t is given for payment contract type i ∈ F and belief θt as
PAt = 1− γ(1− θt) and P
Ω
t = θt(1−λ), respectively. Evidently, it holds that P
Ω
t < P
A
t and, moreover,
the seller can benefit from a smaller risk of transaction failure under Ω-terms the stronger contracting
institutions are.24
As a consequence, when deciding whether or not to provide trade credit to a new buyer (i.e., whether
or not to offer payment onΩ-terms) the seller has to weigh the relationship stability-enhancing advantages
of trade credit with the associated, comparably slow learning process about the buyer and the correspond-
ing moderate growth of stage payoffs on the equilibrium path. In the following section, we study how the
seller can manage this trade-off between relationship stability and stage payoff growth efficiently.
5 Dynamically optimal payment contracts
5.1 Main results
We now study the seller’s optimal choice of payment contracts when he can separately decide between
A- and Ω-terms – and hence about the provision of trade credit – for every period of the repeated game,
23Evidently, the expected stage payoffs at the full information limit may differ between cash in advance and open account
terms. In section 5, we show that the optimal equilibrium can be characterized also for the special case where they are identical.
24Note that PΩt < P
A
t holds irrespective of the probability 1− γ with which the buyer becomes illiquid.
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i.e. Ft ∈ F for all t ≥ 0. This will give us an understanding of how the inter-temporal trade-off outlined
in the previous section affects and determines the optimal choice of payment contracts in the dynamic
context.
Definition The sequence F that maximizes the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs from the trade relation-
ship is called the dynamically optimal sequence of payment contracts (DOSPC).
Determining the DOSPC from a direct comparison of all available sequences is impossible since this
set contains infinitely many elements as a consequence of the infinite time horizon of the game. However,
simple parameter refinements allow us to endogenously reduce the set of possibly optimal sequences to
three elements while maintaining the presence of the inter-temporal trade-off outlined in Section 4.3.
Proposition 3. For all parametrizations of the model that satisfy the constraint
λ < λ ∈ (0, 1) (4)
and, moreover, when α > α ∈ (0, 1) holds there exists δS ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δS > δS we have
F ∈ {(A, ...), (Ω, ...), (A,Ω,Ω, ...)} ≡ FD as the DOSPC.
Proof See Appendix.
The upper bound on the quality of contract enforcement institutions in expression (4) is critical for the
reduction of the set of feasible DOSPCs to FD. It ensures that whenever a trade relationship is initiated
on Ω-terms it is optimal to stick to these terms for all subsequent transactions. The reason is that – for
any belief θΩt – more information is revealed about the buyer under Ω-terms when contracting institutions
are weaker (i.e., when λ is smaller) which reduces the temptation of the seller to switch to A-terms in
later periods of the relationship.25 Whenever λ < λ holds, the growth of expected stage payoffs over
time under the sequence F = (Ω, ...) is large enough to rule out a profitable deviation to A-terms in later
periods. Conversely, when (4) does not hold and, hence, when information acquisition about the buyer’s
type is comparatively slow, the seller may be tempted to switch to the type-separating A-terms once the
probability of buyer non-participation is reduced sufficiently. In this situation, the payoff-relevance of the
trade-off outlined above is marginalized as in market environments with strong enforcement institutions
payment under Ω-terms can be enforced with a high probability and irrespectively of the buyer’s type.
25To see that more information is revealed about the buyer when contracting institutions are weaker, let us define by Θt ≡
(θΩt − θ
Ω
t+1)/θ
Ω
t the share of myopic buyers that is filtered out by the belief updating process in t, provided that the transaction
in t is successful. It is easily shown that ∂Θt/∂λ < 0, i.e. the share of myopic types that can be filtered out in any period on
Ω-terms is smaller when the quality of contracting institutions is higher. In the Appendix, Figure A.1 illustrates how different
levels of the contract enforcement parameter λ translate into the evolution of expected stage payoffs when F = (Ω, ...).
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Moreover, any relationship that starts on A-terms reaches the full information limit after the first
successful transaction. Consequently, given that the first transaction is conducted on A-terms, either the
sequence (A, ...) or (A,Ω,Ω, ...) must be optimal. In this context, the role of the two further parameter
restrictions on α and δS in Proposition 3 is to ensure that non-shipment deviations of the seller are ruled
out whenever A-terms are used.
Summing up, Proposition 3 uncovers that for the case of developing countries with weak enforcement
institutions the trade-off between relationship stability and information acquisition about the buyer out-
lined in Section 4 is sufficient to reduce the set of feasible DOSPCs to FD. In the following Corollary 1,
we investigate under which conditions any F ∈ FD is dynamically optimal. It turns out that all F ∈ FD
can be optimal on the equilibrium path. Imposing mild refinements on the parameter requirements of
Proposition 3 allows us to uniquely identify the DOSPC for all permissible model configurations.26
Corollary 1. Suppose that λ < λ
′
∈ (0, λ], α > α′ ∈ [α, 1), and δS > δS . Then for any tuple (γ, θ0) the
DOSPC can be uniquely determined. Three cases must be distinguished:
• When the probability that the buyer turns illiquid is small, i.e. when γ ≥ γ ∈ (0, 1), then there
exists a unique belief threshold θ
A
0 ∈ (0, 1), such that:
F =

 (A, ...) for θ0 ≤ θ
A
0 ,
(Ω, ...) for θ
A
0 ≤ θ0.
• When the probability that the buyer turns illiquid is moderate, i.e. when γ ∈ [γ, γ], then there exist
unique belief thresholds θ0 ∈ (0, 1) and θ
AΩ
0 ∈ (0, 1) with θ
AΩ
0 > θ0, such that:
F =


(A, ...) for θ0 ≤ θ0,
(A,Ω,Ω, ...) for θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
AΩ
0 ,
(Ω, ...) for θ
AΩ
0 ≤ θ0.
• When the probability that the buyer turns illiquid is high, i.e. when γ ≤ γ ∈ (0, 1), then F =
(Ω, ...).
Proof See Appendix.
Figure 3 provides a graphical summary of the results in Corollary 1. It shows the DOSPC for any
combination of the seller’s initial belief θ0, and the probability γ that the buyer remains liquid from one
26The threshold refinements are sufficient conditions to ensure that ΠΩ is a strictly concave and monotonically decreasing
function in θ0. This allows us to establish the uniqueness of the results in Corollary 1.
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Figure 3: Dynamically optimal sequences of payment contracts in (γ, θ0)-space.
transaction to the next. The corollary shows that for both – new and established relationships that survive
the initial transaction – the usage of Ω-terms and therefore the provision of trade credit by the seller is
more likely optimal the higher θ0 and the lower γ.
27 We elaborate on the reasons for this pattern in the
following.
Consider first the situation in a newly matched buyer-seller relationship. Given the sequences in the
set FD, exclusively the design of C0 determines how the inter-temporal trade-off between relationship
stability and payoff growth is resolved optimally. Corollary 1 shows that the mitigation of relationship
breakdown risks is more likely prioritized to acquiring new information about the buyer the higher the
probability θ0 of drawing a myopic buyer and the smaller the probability γ that the buyer remains liquid. If
θ0 is large then conducting an initial transaction onA-terms is unlikely successful since only a small share
of patient buyers – who moreover have to be liquid – will accept a contract on these terms of payment.
This reduces the ex-ante expected payoffs associated with the sequences (A, ...) and (A,Ω,Ω, ...), making
the optimality of their usage less likely. Similarly, if γ is low, a buyer suffers from liquidity constraints
with a high probability. Since these are never problematic under Ω-terms, i.e. when the buyer is provided
with trade credit, it makes using them during the phase of information acquisition more attractive. In the
situation where γ < γ holds Ω-terms turn out to be optimal for any initial belief level.
In order to understand the rationale for varying payment terms over time it is necessary and sufficient
under the restrictions of Proposition 3 to focus on the situation where A-terms were used initially. This
27Analytically, this is implied by the fact that the threshold functions θ0, θ
A
0 , and θ
AΩ
0 are all monotonically increasing in γ.
See the proof of Corollary 1.
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is because the only sequence in FD that contains switches between payment terms over time is F =
(A,Ω,Ω, ...). While for any γ > γ, the expected stage payoffs in a non-initial transaction are larger under
A-terms (i.e., γpiA > piΩ) continuing the relationship on A-terms retains carrying the risk of loosing a
certainly patient buyer due to newly arising liquidity problems.28 For this additional trade-off, Corollary
1 predicts that as long as the liquidity risks are in the moderate range (i.e., when γ ∈ (γ, γ)) switching
to Ω-terms and thereby eliminating the remaining breakdown risks can be preferable to obtaining a high
level of stage payoffs under full information. More precisely, when the probability of finding a patient
buyer upon relationship breakdown is comparably low (i.e. when θ0 ∈ (θ0, θ
AΩ
0 )) loosing the current
buyer is a threat of high economic relevance to the seller and, as a consequence, he rather accepts lower
stage payoffs and offers trade credit instead of risking to loose the patient buyer that he is currently
matched with. Conversely, when the probability of finding a patient buyer upon relationship breakdown
is high (i.e. when θ0 < θ0) the seller does not find it threatful to loose his current buyer and continues
business onA-terms, i.e. employs F = (A, ...). Moreover, when liquidity risks are low (i.e. when γ > γ)
switching to Ω-terms after an initial transaction on A-terms is never optimal.
5.2 Discussion
Our model proposes a novel mechanism that can explain the substantial availability of trade credit to
buyers in less-developed economies with weak legal institutions. It predicts that sellers will be more
prone to provide trade credit the harder it is for them to find a reliable, patient buyer and the more
deficient the access to liquidity for firms in the destination market. Whenever the seller increases the
provision of trade credit to buyers over time this originates from a learning effect about the buyer’s type
on the one side and is accompanied by the elimination of relationship breakdown risks due to potential
buyer illiquidity on the other side. Effectively, by usingΩ-terms the seller can insure the trade relationship
against breakdown due to unfavourable changes in the buyer’s access to liquidity which – as argued above
– tends to be a particular threat to firms in developing countries.
At the same time, the analysis shows that the different types of payment contracts can be interpreted
as distinct contract enforcement technologies. While under Ω-terms, enforcement is ensured by publicly
available institutions under A-terms it is ensured privately through the design of the contract terms which
are only acceptable to those buyers that are factually able and willing to comply. For new trade rela-
tionships, our theory predicts that whenever the share of compliant buyers is small then relying entirely
on buyer selection to ensure payment (i.e. choosing A-terms for the initial transaction) is inefficient as
28Note that γ > γ is also a necessary condition for (Ω, ...) not to be the payoff-dominant payment contract sequence.
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any relationship with a buyer that is not simultaneously patient and liquid fails immediately. In con-
trast, the “softer” screening under Ω-terms also allows these buyers to take up possibly productive trade
relationships which has a stabilizing effect on the expected payoff stream of the seller.
Our findings point at a dilemma that sellers face when marketing their products in developing coun-
tries. While trade credit provision can be risky as a consequence of unreliable institutions it is at the
same time particularly warranted since liquidity is often scarce for local buyers. We have shown in this
section that acknowledging the screening properties of payment contracts allows to derive unambiguous
recommendations on how a seller can resolve this dilemma efficiently.
6 Trade credit insurance
In international trade, the provision of trade finance through banks and insurance firms is an essential
driver for the growth of firms’ trade volumes (cf. Amiti and Weinstein, 2011). As an example of external
trade finance, we discuss the impact of the availability of trade credit insurance on dynamically optimal
payment contract choice in this section.
Instead of taking the risk of buyer non-payment in an open account transaction in period t himself, the
seller can rule it out by employing a trade credit insurance (Ft = I). We assume that such an insurance is
available to the seller from a perfectly competitive insurance market and that the insurance fee It for the
transaction in period t can be separated into a fixed and a variable component which is given by:
It = m+ δS(1− Λ
I
t )Tt,
where the fixed (and time-invariant) componentm > 0 covers setup and monitoring costs that the insurer
incurs for managing the transaction. The second addend represents the variable component that depends
on the size of the insured transfer, Tt. It is weighted by the probability of nonpayment 1 − Λ
I
t , where
ΛIt denotes the payment probability when in the tth transaction of a trade relationship is conducted under
insurance. Moreover, because potential payment default occurs only in t + 1 the variable component is
discounted. For analytical simplicity we assume the insurer’s discount factor is equal to that of the seller,
δS . Finally, because the insurer has a vital interest that the buyer does not default on the contract it will
engage in buyer screening itself before granting a credit insurance.29 We model this aspect by assuming
29This assumption is endorsed by the fact that trade credit insurers such as Euler Hermes and AIG advertise their insurance
services with their expertise in monitoring the reliability of transaction counterparts.
Overall, our specification of the insurance fee follows the formalization of the letter of credit contract by Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2017). Since the introduction of banks as additional strategic players would render our dynamic model intractable
we refrain from discussing the details of other forms of trade finance such as documentary collections and letters of credit in
this paper and focus our study on the impact of the insurance on the seller’s payment contract choices.
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that initially using a trade credit insurance reduces the proportion of myopic types in the population to
θˆI = φθˆ, where φ ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse measure of the insurer’s ability to screen out myopic types.
Hence, the seller’s belief to face a myopic buyer in the tth transaction on insurance terms is determined
via Bayes’ rule as θIt = θˆ
Iλt/[1 − θˆI(1 − λt)], and the probability of payment in t is given as ΛIt =
[1− θˆI(1− λt+1)]/[1− θˆI(1− λt)].
6.1 The optimal spot contract with insurance
Employing the same strategy profile as before, the participation constraints of the two buyer types under
insurance are the same as in the open account scenario, (PCΩB) and (PC
Ω
M ), respectively. Also, the incen-
tive constraint for the patient buyer to conduct payment is the same as under open account leading the
seller to request the same revenue share s˜ from the buyer. The optimal trade volume in period t, QIt , is
hence determined by maximizing the following stage payoff function:
QIt ≡ argmax
Qt
δS s˜R(Qt)− cQt − It = argmax
Qt
δSδBΛ
I
tR(Qt)− cQt −m.
Observe that even though the insurance eliminates the risk of non-payment, the probability of payment
ΛIt still indirectly affects the seller’s maximization problem through the variable fee component. The
optimal trade volume QIt and the corresponding stage payoffs pi
I(QIt ) are:
QIt =
(
δSδBΛ
I
t
c
) 1
α
, piI(QIt ) =
(
δSδBΛ
I
t
) 1
α c
α−1
α
α
1− α
−m.
6.2 Dynamically optimal payment contracts with insurance
In any period t the seller can now freely choose not only between cash in advance and open account terms
but can alternatively decide to use a trade credit insurance, i.e. Ft ∈ F
+ ≡ {A,Ω, I}. In the following,
we study how the availability of insurance affects the set of feasible dynamically optimal payment contract
sequences. In fact, simple observations together with the parameter restrictions of Proposition 3 allow to
establish that the set of possible DOSPCs is extended by one unique element in the presence of insurance
terms.
Corollary 2. Let Ft ∈ F
+ for all t ≥ 0. Suppose that the parameter constraints of Proposition 3 are
satisfied. Then F ∈ FD ∪ (I,Ω,Ω, ...) ≡ FD+. Moreover, the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs for the
sequence F = (I,Ω,Ω, ...) are given by:
ΠIΩ =
1− δSλ
1− δSλ− δSθI0(1− λ)
[
−m+ piΩ
∞∑
t=0
δtS(Λ
I
t )
1
α (1− θI0(1− λ
t))
]
.
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Proof See Appendix.
The proof of Corollary 2 establishes that F = (I,Ω,Ω, ...) is the only additional sequence that can
become dynamically optimal. This is because, first, I-terms are payoff-dominated by Ω-terms at the full
information limit and after the initial play of I-terms and, second, the informational benefit from insurer
screening is largest in the initial period. In addition, the proof shows that the parameter thresholds of
Proposition 3 are sufficient to establish that FD+ is the full set of feasible DOSPCs when insurance
becomes available. Acknowledging that some F ∈ FD+ must be optimal, the following Corollary 3
shows under which conditions there exist model parametrizations for which insuring the initial open
account transaction maximizes the seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the parameter constraints of Corollary 1 are satisfied. Then for any level of
insurer screening efficiency φ ∈ (0, 1) there exist unique levels m > 0 and θˆ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
m < m and all θ0 > θˆ0 the sequence F = (I,Ω,Ω, ...) is the DOSPC. Ifm > m, then F ∈ F
D.
Proof See Appendix.
Corollary 3 shows that no matter how efficient the insurer is in screening the population of buyers
there always exists an upper bound of insurance fixed costsm > 0 below which the seller finds it optimal
to use F = (I,Ω,Ω, ...), provided that the marginal impact of the insurer’s screening activity is high
enough (i.e. the share of myopic buyers in the population is large enough). Conversely, when the fixed
costs of the insurer are too large (i.e., whenm > m) insurance is never optimal for the seller and the set
of possible DOSPCs reduces to FD.
7 Conclusion
We present evidence on the availability of trade credit to firms from cross-country survey data to motivate
a theoretical analysis on how sellers can employ the payment modalities of their transactions to improve
the efficiency of their trade relationships with buyers. Based on a repeated game model in which trade
volumes and payment modalities are determined endogenously and in which buyer payment compliance
is uncertain, we show that pre- and post-shipment payment terms inhibit structurally different learning
opportunities for the seller. The seller can use the learning properties of payment contracts strategically to
improve the efficiency of trade relationships. Effectively, in deciding whether or not to provide trade credit
requires the seller to prioritize between the stability and the profitability of the exchange relationship with
a buyer. We have shown that the seller can resolve this trade-off optimally by assessing the liquidity
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situation of the buyer on the one side, and her discount factor on the other side. We provide unique
conditions to characterize the dynamically optimal choice of payment contracts in the equilibrium of the
repeated game.
While for the largest part of this paper the analysis has focused on the non-intermediated payment
modes of cash in advance and open account, trade finance products provided by banks and insurance
firms are of substantial practical relevance (cf. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017). Our paper
incorporates external forms of trade finance into the discussion by analysing and identifying the impact
of trade credit insurance on the dynamically optimal choice of payment contracts. While we show that
the main mechanisms of our model are robust to the availability of such an insurance, a promising avenue
for future research is to further explore the micro-foundations of other relevant types of external trade
finance such as letters of credit and documentary collections in a dynamic contracting framework.
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A Theoretical appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
At the Production and Shipment stage (6) of any period the seller will not deviate from the contract if and
only if:
−cQA + δSV
A
1 ≥ (1− λ)(δSV
A
0 ) + λ(−cQ
A + δSV
A
1 ) (5)
Equation (5) states that making the effort to produce the contracted output plus the continuation payoff
from the current relationship with a patient buyer must result in a higher payoff than deviating by not
producing and shipping the agreed quantity QA. In this latter case the current relationship breaks down
and one with a new buyer is started in the following period. Note that deviation is possible only if
contracts cannot be enforced which happens with probability 1− λ. Plugging explicit values for V A0 and
V A1 into (5) and simplifying gives:
−cQA + δS
γ(1− δSθ0)pi
A
(1− δS)(1− γθ0δS)
≥ δS
γ(1− θ0)pi
A
(1− δS)(1− γθ0δS)
(6)
Observing that cQA = piA(1− α)/α we can simplify (6) to:
δS ≥
1− α
γθ0
≡ δ˜S (7)
For an equilibrium to exist we need to ensure that δ˜S < 1. This is the case whenever α > 1− γθ0 ≡
α˜ ∈ (0, 1) holds. In this situation, the non-production deviation of the seller can be ruled if he is patient
enough, i.e. when δS ≥ δ˜S holds.
Proof of Lemma 2
At the Payment stage (2) of period t of a trade relationship the patient buyer will decide not to deviate from
the agreed payment if paying plus the expected continuation payoff from the relationship compensates at
least her outside option (which we normalized to zero):
−sΩR(QΩt ) + (1− s
Ω)
∑∞
i=t+1 δ
i−t
B R(Q
Ω
i ) ≥ 0
⇔ (1− sΩ)
∑∞
i=t+1 δ
i−t
B R(Q
Ω
i ) ≥ s
ΩR(QΩt ) (8)
We would like to obtain a value of sΩ that allows inequality (8) to hold for any belief θΩt . Observing that
∂R(QΩt )
∂t
> 0 and
∂R(QΩt )
2
∂2t
< 0 it is clear that if (8) holds for the limit belief (i.e. for limt→∞ θ
Ω
t = 0) it
also holds for any other belief. Denoting the trade quantity at this limit by QΩ this implies:
(1− sΩ)
∞∑
i=1
δiBR(Q
Ω) ≥ sΩR(QΩ).
Simplifying and rearranging for sΩ gives:
sΩ ≤ δB ≡ s˜
Ω.
The seller will set sΩ = s˜Ω which is the maximal transfer to the seller that the buyer will accept for any
belief θt.
31
Derivation of the ex-ante expected payoffs ΠΩ
This appendix complements the analysis of the main text by providing a non-recursive expression of the
seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs under open account terms. We proceed in two steps. First, we rewrite
the period t-version of equation (3) by repeatedly substituting in the value functions of all subsequent
periods. Second, we solve the resulting equation for period t = 0. By substituting in, we can rewrite (3)
to:
V Ωt = pi
Ω

Λ 1αt + ∞∑
i=t+1
δi−tS Λ
1
α
i
i−1∏
j=t
Λj

+ V Ω0

δS(1− Λt) + ∞∑
i=t
δi−t+2S (1− Λi+1)
i∏
j=t
Λj

 (9)
Observing that
∏i
j=t Λj = (1− θ0(1− λ
i+1))/(1− θ0(1− λ
t)), we can simplify (9) to:
V Ωt =
1
1− θ0(1− λt)
[
piΩ
∞∑
i=t
δi−tS Λ
1
α
i (1− θ0(1− λ
i)) + δSV
Ω
0
(
θ0λ
t(1− λ)
1− λδS
)]
(10)
Now suppose that t = 0. Solving the resulting version of (10) for V Ω0 gives:
ΠΩ =
1− λδS
1− δS(θ0 + (1− θ0)λ)
piΩ
∞∑
t=0
δtSΛ
1
α
t (1− θ0(1− λ
t)).
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is conducted using the following steps:
1. We derive conditions (δS ≥ δ
∗
S , α > α
∗ and λ < λ) which guarantee that whenever choosing
Ω-terms until period t is optimal, it is never optimal to switch to A-terms in period t + 1. This
immediately implies that F ∈ FD.
2. For the sequence (A,Ω, ...) we derive the ex-ante expected payoffs ΠAΩ and conditions equivalent
to Lemma 1 to rule out a non-shipment deviation by the seller in the initial transaction.
3. Derive δS and α by combining the results from Step 1, Step 2, and Lemma 1.
Step 1. Suppose that in all periods {0, 1, ..., t} playingΩ-terms is optimal. For any t, we derive conditions
which ensure that playing Ω-terms in t+1 is also optimal. From equations (1) and (3) the value function
V jt in period t for payment contract type j ∈ F and belief θ
Ω
t (which applies when Ω-terms were used in
all periods prior to t) can, respectively, be rewritten as:
V At = γ(1− θ
Ω
t )pi
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡WA
F
+ δS
[
γ(1− θΩt )V
A
1 + (1− γ(1− θ
Ω
t ))V0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡WA
C
(1’)
V Ωt =(δSΛt)
1
α piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡WΩ
F
+ δS
[
ΛtV
Ω
t+1 + (1− Λt)V0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡WΩ
C
(3’)
We proceed by induction. Note that we have V Ωt > V
A
t by assumption. Upon moving to period t+ 1 on
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Ω-terms, in order to guarantee that V Ωt+1 > V
A
t+1 holds for any belief θ
Ω
t , it is sufficient to ensure:
∂ (ΛtδS)
1
α
∂t
>
∂γ(1− θΩt )
∂t
, (11)
and
∂Λt
∂t
>
∂γ(1− θΩt )
∂t
. (12)
Condition (11) guarantees that by moving from period t to period t+1 on open account terms (and thereby
decreasing the belief to θΩt+1) increases the expected stage payoffs under open account terms, W
Ω
F , by
more than those for cash in advance terms, WAF . Condition (12) ensures the same for the continuation
payoffs WΩC and W
A
C , respectively. To see that the conditions are sufficient note that while V
A
1 and V0
are independent of t the value of V Ωt+1 is increasing in t since (3’) has the same functional structure in all
periods (only the belief θΩt varies and decreases with t).
We derive conditions for both, (11) and (12), to hold. We get:
∂Λt
∂t
>
∂γ(1− θΩt )
∂t
⇔ λ < 1− γ ≡ λ, and (13)
∂ (ΛtδS)
1
α
∂t
>
∂γ(1− θΩt )
∂t
⇔ δS > α
α
(
γ
1− λ
)α
Λα−1t ≡ δ
′
S .
For a solution to Step 1 of the proof to exist, we must ensure that δ′S ∈ (0, 1). To do so, first note that
limα→0 δ
′
S = 1/Λt > 1 and limα→1 δ
′
S = γ/(1 − λ) < 1 by condition (13). Moreover, note that δ
′
S is
strictly convex in α since:
∂2δ′S
∂α2
=
(
αγ
1− λ
)α
Λα−1t
((
ln
(
αγ
1− λ
)
+ lnΛt
)(
ln
(
αγ
1− λ
)
+ ln(Λt) + 2
)
+
1
α
+ 1
)
> 0.
This shows that there exists a unique α′ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ′S ∈ (0, 1) for all α > α
′.
Since δS is fixed while δ
′
S varies with t, we must reduce δ
′
S to a threshold that is sufficient for all t.
Observing that:
∂δ′S
∂t
=
(1− α)ααα
(
γ
1−λ
)α
(1− λ)λt(1− θ0)θ0Λ
α
t ln(λ)
(1− θ0(1− λ1+t))2
< 0
establishes that:
δS > α
α
(
γ
1− λ
)α
Λα−10 ≡ δ
∗
S
is sufficient for all periods. We denote by:
α∗ ≡ α′
∣∣
t=0
=
lnΛ0
W
(
γ
1−λΛ0 ln Λ0
) ∈ (0, 1)
the corresponding lower bound of the revenue concavity parameter, where α∗ can be expressed explicitly
using the Lambert W function. Hence, equivalently to above there exists a unique α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
δ∗S ∈ (0, 1) for all α > α
∗ provided that λ < λ holds.
Summing up, we have established that whenever δS ≥ δ
∗
S , α > α
∗, and λ < λ, then V Ωt > V
A
t ⇒
V Ωt′ > V
A
t′ for any t
′ > t. Consequently, whenever A-terms are part of a dynamically optimal sequence
of payment contracts they will be used in the initial period. From the analysis in Section 4.1 we know
that A-terms separate buyer types and, when used initially, θt = 0 for all t > 0. In this situation, the
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model reaches an absorbing state (full information) in which either A-terms or Ω-terms will be used in
all periods t > 0. Hence, the dynamically optimal sequence of payment contracts must be an element of
FD.
Step 2. The ex-ante expected payoffs implied by the payment contract sequence (A,Ω, ...) can be ob-
tained from solving the following recursion for V AΩ0 :
V AΩ0 = γ(1− θ0)
[
piA + δSV
AΩ
1
]
+ (1− γ(1− θ0))δSV
AΩ
0 , V
AΩ
1 =
piΩ
1− δS
.
The solution is:
ΠAΩ =
γ(1− θ0)(δSpi
Ω + (1− δS)pi
A)
(1− δS)(1− δS + δSγ(1− θ0))
. (14)
We have to show that at the Production and Shipment stage of any period the seller will not deviate from
the contract under the sequence (A,Ω,Ω, ...). Using the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 1 this is the
case if and only if:
−cQA + δSV
AΩ
1 ≥ δSV
AΩ
0 ⇔ Γ(α, γ, δS , θ0) ≡ α+ δS − αδS(1− δ
1
α
S )− δSγ(1− θ0)− 1 ≥ 0.
Our aim is to show existence of δ′′S ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δS ≥ δ
′′
S the non-shipment deviation is ruled
out. To do so, it is necessary to show that ∂Γ/∂δS > 0. Note that:
∂Γ
∂δS
> 0 ⇔ δS >
(
γ(1− θ0)− 1 + α
1 + α
)α
≡ δˆS .
Since the equilibria that we study are constrained to δS > δ
∗
S , in order to show that ∂Γ/∂δS > 0 it is
sufficient to ensure that δ∗S > δˆS holds. Existence of δˆS requires that α > 1 − γ(1 − θ0) ≡ α
′′ ∈ (0, 1)
and also implies that δ∗S > δˆS .
Provided that α > α′′ holds, the equation Γ(α, γ, δS , θ0) = 0 implicitly determines the mini-
mum patience level δ′′S ensuring non-deviation for all δS > δ
′′
S . Note that δ
′′
S < 1 always holds since
limδS→1 Γ = α− γ(1− θ0) > 0 for all α > α
′′.
Step 3. It directly follows from Steps 1 and 2 of the proof and Lemma 1 that wheneverα > max{α∗, α′′, α˜} ≡
α ∈ (0, 1) and λ < λ hold there exists δS ≡ max{δ
∗
S , δ
′′
S , δ˜S} ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δS > δS we have
F ∈ FD as the dynamically optimal sequence of payment contracts in the repeated game equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1
The proof is conducted using the following steps:
1. Show that ΠA and ΠAΩ are monotonically decreasing and strictly concave functions in θ0. Estab-
lish that the same is true for ΠΩ provided that λ < λ
′
and α > α′ hold.
2. Show that for all γ > γ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a unique value θ
AΩ
0 ∈ (0, 1) (respectively, θ
A
0 ∈ (0, 1))
such thatΠAΩ > ΠΩ (resp.,ΠA > ΠΩ) if and only if θ0 < θ
AΩ
0 (resp., θ0 < θ
A
0 ) holds. Conversely,
when γ < γ we get ΠΩ > max{ΠA,ΠAΩ} for all θ0 ∈ (0, 1).
3. Show there exists a unique θ0 such that Π
A > ΠAΩ if and only if θ0 < θ0. Moreover, θ0 ∈ (0, 1)
if and only if γ ∈ (γ, γ˜) with γ˜ ∈ (0, 1).
34
4. Show existence of γ ∈ (γ, γ˜) which allows to establish the systematic characterization of all pa-
rameter combinations {γ, θ0} into unique DOSPC as proposed by the Corollary.
Step 1. The desired properties are easily established for ΠA and ΠAΩ by observing that:
∂ΠA
∂θ0
= −
γ(1− δSγ)pi
A
(1− δS)(1− δSγθ0)2
< 0,
∂2ΠA
∂θ20
= −
2δSγ
2(1− δSγ)pi
A
(1− δS)(1− δSγθ0)3
< 0,
∂ΠAΩ
∂θ0
= −
γ[(1− δS)pi
A + δSpi
Ω]
(1− δS + δSγ(1− θ0))2
< 0,
∂2ΠAΩ
∂θ20
= −
2δSγ
2[(1− δS)pi
A + δSpi
Ω]
(1− δS + δSγ(1− θ0))3
< 0.
The argument for ΠΩ is more subtle because the function contains a complicated infinite sequence. To
proceed, let us define:
ΠΩt ≡
(1− λδS)(1− θ0(1− λ
t))
1− δS(θ0 + (1− θ0)λ)
δtSΛ
1
α
t pi
Ω,
where ΠΩ =
∑∞
t=0Π
Ω
t . Let us start by showing concavity. Our aim is to establish a condition under
which, for all periods t, ∂2ΠΩt /∂θ
2
0 < 0 holds which implies that ∂
2ΠΩ/∂θ20 < 0 holds as well. We get:
∂2ΠΩt
∂θ20
< 0 ⇔ K(t, δS , λ, θ0, α) ≡
1− α
α
∆(t, δS , λ, θ0)− 2δS(1− λ) [E(t, δS , λ, θ0) + αZ(t, δS , λ)] < 0,
(15)
where ∆(t, δS , λ, θ0) ≡
(1− δSλ− δSθ0(1− λ))
2(1− λ)λt
(1− θ0(1− λt+1))2(1− θ0(1− λt))
> 0,
E(t, δS , λ, θ0) ≡
(1− δSλ− δSθ0(1− λ))(1− λ)λ
t
(1− θ0(1− λt+1))
> 0,
Z(t, δS , λ) ≡ 1− δS − λ
t(1− δSλ).
Let H(t, δS , λ, θ0) ≡ E(t, δS , λ, θ0) + αZ(t, δS , λ). Observe that H > 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1) if we
establish that H |α→1> 0 since Z is possibly negative, and E > 0. We get:
H |α→1> 0 ⇔ ξ(t, δS , λ) ≡ 1− λ
t+1 − δS(1− λ
t+2) > 0.
Since ∂ξ/∂t > 0, it is sufficient to check ξ |t=0> 0. Rearranging the latter gives:
λ <
1− δS
δS
≡ λˆ > 0.
Consequently, under the assumption that λ < λˆ, we have thatK is decreasing in α and since limα→1K =
−2δS(1− λ)H < 0 and limα→0K =∞ there must exist α ∈ (0, 1) such thatK < 0 for all α > α. We
therefore conclude that ΠΩ is concave in θ0 for all α > α and all λ < λˆ.
Remains to show that ΠΩ is decreasing in θ0. To do so we show that the parameter conditions that
establish concavity are sufficient for ∂ΠΩt /∂θ0 < 0 to hold in all periods as well which implies that
∂ΠΩ/∂θ0 < 0 is true. We get:
∂ΠΩt
∂θ0
< 0 ⇔ H(t, δS , λ, θ0) > 0.
Clearly, the same arguments as above establish that ∂ΠΩ/∂θ0 < 0 if λ < λˆ. For further use we define
α′ ≡ max{α, α} and λ
′
≡ min{λ, λˆ}.
Step 2. We proceed by studying the limit properties of the payoff functions in θ0. First, observe that
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limθ0→1Π
AΩ = limθ0→1Π
A = 0 < limθ0→1Π
Ω = λ
1
αpiΩ/(1− δS). Moreover, we have:
lim
θ0→0
ΠAΩ =
γ(δSpi
Ω + (1− δS)pi
A)
(1− δS)(1− δS + δSγ)
, lim
θ0→0
ΠA =
γpiA
1− δS
, lim
θ0→0
ΠΩ =
piΩ
1− δS
.
It is easily shown that limθ0→0Π
A > limθ0→0Π
AΩ > limθ0→0Π
Ω if and only if γ > δ
1
α
S ≡ γ ∈ (0, 1)
and limθ0→0Π
A < limθ0→0Π
AΩ < limθ0→0Π
Ω otherwise.
From these observations and the properties of the payoff functions established in Step 1 it immediately
follows that for all γ > γ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a unique value θ
AΩ
0 ∈ (0, 1) (respectively, θ
A
0 ∈ (0, 1))
such that ΠAΩ > ΠΩ (resp., ΠA > ΠΩ) if and only if θ0 < θ
AΩ
0 (resp., θ0 < θ
A
0 ) holds. Moreover, since
∂ΠA/∂γ > 0, ∂ΠAΩ/∂γ > 0, and ∂ΠΩ/∂γ = 0 it follows that ∂θ
A
0 /∂γ > 0 and ∂θ
AΩ
0 /∂γ > 0.
By taking together the above arguments and by observing that limθ0→0Π
A = limθ0→0Π
AΩ =
limθ0→0Π
Ω at γ = γ it immediately follows that ΠΩ > max{ΠA,ΠAΩ} for all γ < γ.
Step 3. Observe that:
ΠA ≥ ΠAΩ ⇔ θ0 ≤
γ − δ
1
α
S
δSγ(1− δ
1
α
S )
≡ θ0.
Note that θ0 > 0 if and only if γ > γ. Clearly, θ0 is monotonically increasing and strictly concave in γ
and there exists γ˜ ≡ δ
1
α
S /(1− δS(1− δ
1
α
S )) ∈ (0, 1) such that θ0 ∈ (0, 1) for all γ ∈ (γ, γ˜).
Step 4. Observe that θ0 = 1 at γ = γ˜ and that θ
A
0 < 1 and θ
AΩ
0 < 1 for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently
since the thresholds θ
A
0 , θ
AΩ
0 , and θ0 are all increasing in γ and by definition of these thresholds there
exists γ ∈ (γ, γ˜) and a corresponding belief level θ˜0 ∈ (0, 1) at which θ
A
0 = θ
AΩ
0 = θ0 holds. From
the properties of the payoff functions derived in Step 1 and 2 and the threshold definitions we have that
θ
AΩ
0 > θ
A
0 > θ0 if and only if γ ∈ (γ, γ) and moreover thatΠ
AΩ > max{ΠA,ΠΩ} for all θ0 ∈ (θ0, θ
AΩ
0 )
in this γ-range. For the scenario where γ ∈ (γ, γ) it also follows from the threshold definitions that
ΠA > max{ΠAΩ,ΠΩ} for all θ0 ∈ (0, θ0) and that Π
Ω > max{ΠAΩ,ΠA} for all θ0 ∈ (θ
AΩ
0 , 1). When
γ > γ we have that θ
A
0 > θ
AΩ
0 which together with the properties of the payoff functions derived in Step
1 and 2 implies that ΠA > max{ΠAΩ,ΠΩ} for all θ0 ∈ (0, θ
A
0 ) and Π
Ω > max{ΠAΩ,ΠA} otherwise.
Proof of Corollary 2
First, note that I-terms cannot follow on A-terms because at the full information limit I-terms are domi-
nated by Ω-terms. The reason is that with A-terms being used in the first period the game reaches the full
information limit after the initial transaction and upon playing Ω-terms the seller can save the fixed costs
of the insurance,m.
Second, note that I-terms cannot follow on Ω-terms. To see this, let us rewrite the belief under
payment contract j ∈ {Ω, I} for period t + 1 as θjt+1 = θ
j
tλ/(1 − θ
j
t (1 − λ)). Note that θ
j
t+1 is an
increasing and strictly convex function in θjt . Consequently, the incentive to employ insurance is largest
in the initial period since it implies the largest informational gain from the insurer’s screening activity.
Hence, whenever trade credit insurance is used it will be employed in the initial transaction.
Note also, that insurance will not be used for more than the initial period. The reason is that in any
further transaction with the same buyer the seller can benefit from the insurer’s screening technology
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also under Ω-terms. However, by not using the insurance he can save the fixed insurance costs m in the
subsequent periods.
To complete the proof, it remains to establish that A-terms cannot follow on an initial period on I-
terms. To do so we can apply fully analogously the induction technique from the proof of Proposition 3.
Assume that in the initial period I-terms are used and Ω-terms in all following transactions up to period
t− 1. Then in period t the value functions under A-terms and Ω-terms respectively are:
V At =γ(1− θ
I
t )pi
A + δS
[
γ(1− θIt )V
A
t+1 + (1− γ(1− θ
I
t ))V0
]
, (1”)
V Ωt =
(
δSΛ
I
t
) 1
α piA + δS
[
ΛItV
Ω
t+1 + (1− Λ
I
t )V0
]
. (3”)
Comparison of (1”) and (3”) with equations (1’) and (3’) shows that the only difference between the
respective expressions is the belief on the buyer type, θIt , which derives from the identical updating
process as underΩ-terms. The only difference is that the initial belief under I-terms is shifted downwards
to θΩ0 φ. Acknowledging this, we can proceed with the identical steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 to
establish that under the same parameter conditions V Ωt > V
A
t ⇒ V
Ω
t+1 > V
A
t+1.
The ex-ante expected payoffs under the sequence F = (I,Ω,Ω, ...) can be obtained from the follow-
ing program:
V IΩ0 = pi
I(QI0) + δS
[
ΛI0V
IΩ
1 + (1− Λ
I
0)V
IΩ
0
]
,
∀t > 0 : V IΩt = pi
Ω(QIt ) + δS
[
ΛItV
IΩ
t+1 + (1− Λ
I
t )V
IΩ
0
]
.
(16)
Solving (16) for V IΩ0 by using the same steps as in the derivation of Π
Ω gives:
ΠIΩ =
1− δSλ
1− δSλ− δSθI0(1− λ)
[
−m+ piΩ
∞∑
t=0
δtS(Λ
I
t )
1
α (1− θI0(1− λ
t))
]
.
Proof of Corollary 3
We begin by showing that ΠIΩ is monotonically decreasing and strictly concave under the conditions of
Corollary 1. Let us rearrange ΠIΩ as:
ΠIΩ =M +
1− δSλ
1− δSλ− δSθI0(1− λ)
piΩ
∞∑
t=0
δtS(Λ
I
t )
1
α (1− θI0(1− λ
t))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΠIΩ−
,
whereM ≡ −m(1− δSλ)/(1− δSλ− δSθ
I
0(1− λ)). First, note that ∂M/∂θ0 < 0, and ∂
2M/∂θ20 < 0.
Next, note that because θI0 = φθ0, the exact same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 1 can be used to
establish that ΠIΩ− is a monotonically decreasing and strictly concave function in θ0. Taking this together
with the functional properties ofM derived above establishes thatΠIΩ is a monotonically decreasing and
strictly concave function in θ0 under the parameter conditions of Corollary 1. Note, that by the same line
of arguments the same functional properties are obtained w.r.t. the insurance screening parameter φ.
We continue by comparing the limit properties ofΠΩ andΠIΩ w.r.t. θ0. First, note that limθ0→0Π
IΩ =
−m + piΩ/(1 − δS) < limθ0→0Π
Ω. Since both, ΠΩ and ΠIΩ are monotonically decreasing and strictly
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concave in θ0, whenever:
lim
θ0→1
ΠIΩ > lim
θ0→1
ΠΩ
⇔ m < piΩ
[
λ
1
α (1− δSλ− δSφ(1− λ))
(1− δS)(1− δSλ)
−
∞∑
t=0
δtS
(
1− φ(1− λt+1)
1− φ(1− λt)
) 1
α
(1− φ(1− λt))
]
≡ m
then there exists a unique θˆ′0 ∈ (0, 1) at which Π
IΩ = ΠΩ and ΠIΩ > ΠΩ if and only if θ0 > θˆ
′
0. Noting
from Corollary 1 that for θ0 → 1 the sequence (Ω, ...) payoff-dominates (A, ...) and (A,Ω,Ω, ...), we can
infer that there must exist θˆ0 ∈ [θˆ
′
0, 1) such that for all θ0 > θˆ0 we have thatΠ
IΩ > max{ΠΩ,ΠAΩ,ΠA}.
A.2 Supplementary figures
0 1 2 3 4 5
piΩ
t
E
x
p
ec
te
d
st
ag
e
p
ay
o
ff
s
Λ(t, θˆ, λ1)
1
αpiΩ
Λ(t, θˆ, λ2)
1
αpiΩ
Figure A.1: The evolution of the expected stage payoffs for F = (Ω, ...) when λ1 > λ2.
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B Data appendix
Table B.1 gives an overview of the number of observations per country and year in our dataset. Table B.2
shows the value of the Rule of Law index for all sampled countries for the year 2012. Table B.3 gives an
overview of the number of observations per industry (at the ISIC Rev. 3.1 2-digit division level) and year
in our dataset.
Table B.1: Number of establishments per country and year.
BEEPS survey wave
Country (country code) III (2005) V (2012) VI (2018) Total
Albania (Alb) 120 203 270 593
Belarus (Bel) 153 266 502 921
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bos) 129 278 233 640
Czech Republic (Cze) 162 196 391 749
Estonia (Est) 92 188 242 522
Georgia (Geo) 111 260 372 743
Kazakhstan (Kaz) 428 423 1,115 1,966
Kyrgyz Republic (Kyr) 111 168 264 543
Latvia (Lat) 120 232 228 580
Lithuania (Lit) 93 177 266 536
Moldova (Mol) 285 252 275 812
North Macedonia (Mac) 128 265 251 644
Poland (Pol) 710 384 860 1,954
Russian Federation (Rus) 307 2,955 1,080 4,342
Slovenia (Slo) 97 200 292 589
Tajikistan (Taj) 107 210 218 535
Turkey (Tur) 363 1,008 958 2,329
Ukraine (Ukr) 319 848 1,101 2,268
Uzbekistan (Uzb) 174 267 979 1,420
Total 4,009 8,780 9,897 22,686
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Table B.2: The Rule of Law index across countries.
Country IQc,2012
Albania -.5203165
Belarus -.9370039
Bosnia and Herzegovina -.2067376
Czech Republic 1.041853
Estonia 1.157107
Georgia -.0145615
Kazakhstan -.6846134
Kyrgyz Republic -1.129482
Latvia .7854767
Lithuania .8504152
Moldova -.3247726
North Macedonia -.2207166
Poland .7804115
Russian Federation -.8184694
Slovenia 1.014999
Tajikistan -1.200411
Turkey .0363039
Ukraine -.7828971
Uzbekistan -1.290211
Table B.3: Number of establishments per industry and year.
BEEPS survey wave
Industry (ISIC Rev. 3.1 division code) III (2005) V (2012) VI (2018) Total
15 639 751 1,443 2,833
16 12 2 4 18
17 87 254 403 744
18 333 417 863 1,613
19 34 45 89 168
20 72 210 210 492
21 12 62 77 151
22 119 242 189 550
23 4 7 12 23
24 61 281 213 555
25 61 284 434 779
26 91 502 729 1,322
27 28 54 64 146
28 320 461 774 1,555
29 192 392 632 1,216
30 6 10 13 29
31 40 166 132 338
32 6 30 25 61
33 23 130 79 232
34 22 39 74 135
35 9 39 35 83
36 142 260 375 777
37 1 20 55 76
50 124 233 262 619
51 595 1,731 860 3,186
52 976 2,158 1,851 4,985
Total 4,009 8,780 9,897 22,686
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Table B.4 summarizes our robustness checks. In specification (1), we have included the observations
from all those ISIC Rev. 3.1 sections which were part of wave VI of the BEEPS survey (these are
sections D, F, G, H, I, K). Establishments from these sections were also interviewed in survey waves III
and V. In specification (2), only firms were included that do not consist of more than one establishment.
In specification (3), establishments were included only if they reported to be direct exporters of their
products.
Table B.4: Institutional quality and input purchases on trade credit – Robustness.
(1) (2) (3)
Including
all industries
Single-estab.
firms only
Exporters
only
IQc 16.38** 15.89** 19.39**
(3.37) (4.73) (4.15)
IQc × Year2012 -1.57 -7.42 -3.26
(4.36) (9.75) (5.85)
IQc × Year2018 -12.87* -15.85** -17.65*
(5.57) (5.85) (7.93)
Year2012 10.43** 15.57
+ 8.23+
(3.57) (8.29) (4.48)
Year2018 -7.67
+ -8.10+ -11.15+
(4.41) (4.41) (5.65)
Constant 22.17 70.80* 68.65+
(19.13) (26.39) (35.21)
Firm-level controls Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y Y
Country-level controls Y Y Y
Observations 28,613 14,275 4,983
R2 0.143 0.120 0.155
Joint significance
(Prob > F)
0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm-level and country-level controls contain all the variables described in
Table 1. Industry dummies are included at the 2-digit division level of the
ISIC Rev. 3.1 classification. Standard errors are clustered at the country-
year level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ** p<.01, *
p<.05, + p<.1
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